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We show that the fidelity result of entanglement purifi-
cation protocol with 2-way classical communications (C. H.
Bennett et al, Phys. Rev. Lett., 76, 722(1996)) is always
correct with whatever initial states. We then give a general
criteria on the unconditional entanglement purification: if a
protocol satisfies our condition, the fidelity result of the pro-
tocol with the product form of initial state for the raw pairs is
also correct for the same protocol with arbitrary initial state
for of the raw pairs. With this general condition, we conclude
that all existing purification protocols can work uncondition-
ally.
Quantum entanglement is one of the most important
resources in quantum information processing [1]. There
are purification protocols on how to distill almost per-
fect entangled pairs (EPR pairs) from a larger number
lower quality pairs, by only local operations and classical
communications. There are different types of entangle-
ment purification protocols [2–6]. In the earliest proto-
cols [2–4], it was assumed that those raw pairs shared by
Alice and Bob are in a product state: there are no en-
tanglement among those pairs. The idea of entanglement
purification was then used to the very important prob-
lem of security proof of quantum key distribution(QKD)
[8]: if Alice and Bob can share almost perfect EPR pairs
through purification, they can share a secret key by mea-
suring each pairs in the same basis on each side. This idea
first appeared in Ref [4], with the advantage distillation
protocol [3]. However, since the purification protocol it-
self assumes the product state for the initially shared raw
pairs, it was concerned in Ref [4] that:“if Eve provides
pairs which are entangled with each other”, then the re-
mained pairs after distillation “may not converge to the
pure state |φ+〉〈φ+|”. It was then shown by Lo and Chau
[7] that the result of hashing protocol given by Bennett
et al [2] is actually correct with whatever form of initial
states therefore a type of security proof for QKD was
strictly set up. After that, Shor and Preskill show that
Lo-Chau’s security proof can be reduced to the BB84
protocol which contains no difficult techniques such as
quantum storage or collective measurements. (We shall
call this type of protocol as prepare-and-measure proto-
col.) In the whole security proof of the BB84 [8] protocol
based on viewpoint of entanglement purification, there
are two important steps: (1), the entanglement purifica-
tion protocol actually works unconditionally, with what-
ever type of initial state; (2), the purification can be clas-
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sicalized therefore on can reduce it to a type of prepare-
and-measure QKD protocol, the standard BB84. Latter,
the second step was studied in a more general background
and a general condition on classicalization was given [6].
With such a generalization, one does not have to specifi-
cally construct the classicalization step in a new protocol.
Instead, one may directly use the main theorem in Ref
[6]. However, so far there is no general statement on
step 1, the unconditional entanglement purification. Say,
given a purification protocol with product form of initial
state for the raw pairs, under which condition the fidelity
result of the final pairs is still correct given whatever ini-
tial state for the raw pairs. In this Letter, we study this
problem and shall give a general condition for the uncon-
ditional entanglement purification. With our theorem,
we find that all existing purification protocols can work
unconditionally.
For clarity, we shall consider the details of a special
case first, the (modified) advantage distillation [3,4]. This
is a 2-pair error-rejection protocol with 2-way classical
communications (2-CC). We then state our general theo-
rem and consider other entanglement purification proto-
cols [2,6] with our theorem. Note that so far no one has
shown explicitly that the 2-CC protocol works uncondi-
tionally with whatever type of channel noise, though the
question to protocol with 1 way classical communications
(1-CC) [2] has been studied [7]. Our main contribution
here is to give a general statement of the condition for
unconditional entanglement purification. Since our proof
is closely related to Lo-Chau’s security proof [7], we re-
gard our result as generalized effects of Lo-Chau’s secu-
rity proof.
Let’s first state our main idea. If the initial state is not
a product form, classical statistics does not necessarily
work. Therefore we should not blindly assume anything
of classical statistics, including the error estimation from
samples. To make everything clear, we shall start from
a silly protocol where Alice and Bob take a dark Bell
measurement (i.e. a Bell measurement without reading
the measurement result) to each raw pairs. After this
step, we can safely define the rates of each Bell states
for the raw pairs by classical statistics. We regard state
|φ+〉 as the perfect EPR state. Therefore in the case
that a dark Bell measurement has been done to each raw
pairs, the state for raw pairs is in a product form. In
the estimation, we let Alice and Bob do collective mea-
surements XX,Y Y, ZZ to test pairs. These collective
measurements are just the parity measurement in differ-
ent bases, e.g., the measurement result of XX is 0 or 1
if the bit values in X basis in two sides of the measured
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pair are same or different. Since all these parity measure-
ments commute, classical sampling theory works exactly
in estimating the rate of different Bell states. After mea-
suring the test pairs, they know the distribution over 4
Bell states for the remained raw pairs by the classical
sampling theory. Also, in our initial protocol, all opera-
tions commute and classical statistics works throughout
the whole protocol. The fidelity between the finally dis-
tilled m pairs and the m products of perfect EPR state
(|φ+〉) is given by classical statistics. We then show that
the initial dark Bell measurement to each raw pairs can
be deleted and all the collective measurements involved
in the protocol can be replaced by local measurement on
X,Y, Z basis in each side with the fidelity of the distilled
m pairs being unchanged. Eve’s information is limitted
by the Holevo bound [7] therefore if the fidelity of the
distilled m pairs is sufficiently close to 1, her amount of
information to the final key is negligible.
We denote Z,X, Y as measurement in the bases of
{|0〉, |1〉}, {|±〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 ± |1〉)},{|y±〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 ± i|1〉)}
respectively. We use the notation |φ±〉, |ψ±〉 for 4 Bell
states 1√
2
(|00〉 ± |11〉), 1√
2
(|01〉 ± |10〉). We shall use
WW for collective measurement to a pair in W basis
and W ⊗W for local measurement in W basis in each
side, where W can be X,Y or Z. In the purification pro-
tocol we assume intially Alice and Bob share N raw pairs
and our motivation is to distill m very good pairs finally,
with its fidelity to state (|φ+〉〈φ+|)
m
being exponentially
close to 1.
Consider the following (silly) entanglement purifica-
tion protocol with everything clearly defined:
Protocol 1:
Step 1: Entanglement distribution: Alice prepares N
perfect EPR pairs, |φ+; 〉. She sends half of each pair to
Bob (over a noisy channey in general). N is a very large
natural number. Step 2: Dark Bell measurement: They
take a Bell measurement to each pair but don’t read the
measurement results. Step 3: Error test. They randomly
pick out 3k pairs and equally divide them into 3 groups.
Note that k is large but k << N . They take collective
measurement of XX to each pair in the first group, Y Y
to each pair in the second group and ZZ to each pair in
the third group. They then send the pairs in group 1,2,3
to trash can Tx, T y, T z, respectively. If too many of the
measurement results are 1 they abort the protocol; oth-
erwise they continue. Step 4: Error rejection. a.) Bit-flip
error rejection. They randomly group the remained pairs
outside the trash cans with each group containing 2 pairs.
To each 2-pair group, they collect the parity information
to one pair (the destination pair) by a controlled-NOT
[1] operation on each side (bi-CNOT) in Z−basis. They
take a collective measurement of ZZ to the destination
pair. If the result is 0, they put the destination pair to
the trash can Tz and keep the other pair; if it is 1, they
send the destination pair to trash can Tz and discard
the other pair permenantly. b.) Phase-flip error rejec-
tion. They randomly group the remained pairs outside
the trash cans with each group containing 2 pairs. To
each 2-pair group, they collect the X−basis parity infor-
mation to the destination pair by an X−basis bi-CNOT
operation. They take a collective measurement of XX
to the destination pair. If the result is 0, they send the
destination pair to the trash can Tx and keep the other
pair, if it is 1, they send the destination to trash can Tx
and discard the other pair permenantly. They do opera-
tions in a.) and b.) iteratively until they believe that the
state of the remained pairs outside the trash cans is very
close to a product state of |φ+〉〈φ+|. We assume there
are m pairs remained outside the trash cans then.
We call this protocol as a silly protocol because it is
not useful in any real entanglement purification or QKD,
due to the fact that Alice and Bob have to come together
to make the collective measurements. However, it is an
effective mathematical tool to clearly show the security
of the final useful protocol.
We regard a pair as a good pair if it is in state |φ+〉;
a bad pair if it is in any one of the other 3 Bell states.
Note that a good pair always has the parity 0 in what
ever bases of X,Y, Z, while there is always a certain basis
where a bad pair has the parity 1 for sure. After Step
2 all quantum entanglement among different pairs are
removed therefore classical statistics works exactly with
all measurement bases being commute. In particular,
after Step 3, the probability of obtaining more than δN 1s
by measurement WW on the remained pairs and finding
more than (δ− ǫ0)k 1s by measurement WW on a group
of k pairs is less than exp[− 1
4
ǫ20N/(δ − δ
2)]. Given the
joint information of parity value distribution in 3 bases,
one may calculate the rate of good pairs and each of the
3 types of bad pairs in remained N − 3k raw pairs. We
denote qI , qx, qy, qz for the rate of |φ
+〉, |ψ+〉, |ψ−〉, |φ−〉.
The different rates of each of the 4 Bell states after and
before bit-flip error rejection are related by the following
formulas [9]


q′I =
p2I + p
2
z
(qI + qz)2 + (qx + qy)2
,
q′x =
q2x + q
2
y
(qI + qz)2 + (px + py)2
,
q′y =
2qxqy
(qI + qz)2 + (qx + qy)2
,
q′z =
2qIqz
(qI + qz)2 + (qx + py)2
.
(1)
Here the left hand sides are the quantities after bit-flip
rejection operation and the symbols in right hand sides
of each equations are for the quantities before bit-flip re-
jection operation. Switching qx and qz we shall obtain
the relations after and before phase-flip rejection opera-
tion. This shows that part a.) of Step 4 reduces the rate
of bad pairs of |ψ±〉; part b.) reduces the rate of bad
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pairs of |φ−〉, |ψ−〉. Also, it can be shown that, the rate
of remained pairs after the Bit-flip rejection is
f =
1
2
1
(qI + qz)2 + (qx + py)2
. (2)
If the initial error rates are small (say, qx = qy = qz = t0),
after g rounds of error rejection, the rate of remained
pairs is in the magnitude order of 4−g while the new
bad-pair rate is in the magnitude order of 4gt2
g
0 . If t0
is small, a few steps of repetition of error-rejection is
sufficient. This has been demonstrated numerically by
Deutsch et al [4]. We conclude that with an appropriate
number of iteration, the state of the finally remained m
pairs ρm must be exponentially close to m perfect EPR
pairs, i.e.
< Φm|ρm|Φm >= 1− ǫ (3)
and ǫ is a small number exponentially close to 0, |Φm〉 =
|φ+〉⊗m.
The order of Step 2 and Step 3 can be exchanged since
the collective measurements in Step 3 are just coarse-
grained Bell measurements which commute with the dark
Bell measurements in Step 2. For example, measurement
ZZ is simply a measurement on whether the pair belongs
to subspace {|φ±〉} or subspace {|ψ±〉}.
Consider the bi-CNOT in Z basis. On each side they
take the unitary operation of |0〉|0〉 → |0〉|0〉, |0〉|1〉 →
|0〉|1〉, |1〉|0〉 → |1〉|1〉, |1〉|1〉 → |1〉|0〉, with the second
state being the destination qubit. Consequently, if the
second pair is destination pair, a Z−basis bi-CNOT op-
eration is a permutation in Bell basis as the following
|χi,j〉|χi′,j′〉 −→ |χi⊕i′,j〉|χi′,j′⊕j〉. (4)
Here i, j can be either 0 or 1, |χ0,0〉,|χ1,0〉,|χ0,1〉,|χ1,1〉
are notations for |φ+〉, |φ−〉, |ψ+〉,|ψ−〉, respectively and
symbol ⊕ is the calculation of summation mod 2. This
permutation operation and the dark Bell measurement
commute. Proof: Given arbitrary l−pair state ρl, one can
always write in the form ρl =
∑
l |〈bl|ρl|bl〉·bl〉〈bl|+Oˆoff ,
where {|bl〉} is the Bell bases for l pairs, l is from 1 to 4
l,
Oˆoff contains all off-diagonal terms in Bell bases which
have no contribution to the outcome of Bell measure-
ment. With the original order of the protocol, i.e., first
take dark measurement and then take bi-CNOTs, the
outcome state is ρf = Pˆ (
∑
l |〈bl|ρl|bl〉 · bl〉〈bl|) and Pˆ
is the permutation given by bi-CNOTs. If we reverse
the order, after the bi-CNOTs, the state is changed to
Pˆ (
∑
l |〈bl|ρl|bl〉 · bl〉〈bl|) + Pˆ (ρoff ). Note that with the
permutation Pˆ in Bell bases, the off-diagonal terms will
be still off-diagonal and the diagonal terms will be still
diagonal. If we then take the Dark Bell measurement,
only the diagonal terms survive. This is to say, with the
order being reversed, the outcome is also ρf . This makes
the proof.
Similarly, one can show that the X−basis bi-CNOT also
commutes with the dark Bell measurement. Therefore
all bi-CNOT operations commute with the Bell measure-
ment in Step 2. Therefore all operations in Step 4 and
Step 2 commute, consequently we can exchange the or-
der of Step 2 and Step 4, i.e. Step 2 in protocol 1 can
be delayed until the end of the protocol. This dark Bell
measurement in the end of the protocol can be deleted
because it does not change the fidelity of the remained
m pairs. Explicitly, given any state of l pairs, ρl, after a
dark Bell measurement to each pair, the state is changed
to ρ′l =
∑
i〈bi|ρ
′
l|bi〉 · |bi〉〈bi|, with {|bi〉} being l−Bell
basis and i running from 1 to 4l. The fidelity of ρ′l is
〈b1|ρ
′
l|b1〉 = 〈b1|
∑
i
〈bi|ρ
′
l|bi〉 · |bi〉〈bi|b1〉 = 〈b1|ρl|b1〉 (5)
and |b1〉 = |φ
+〉⊗l. This shows that, although the dark
Bell measurement may change the state of remained m
pairs, it does not change the fidelity. Due to the above
arguments, we now give the following modified protocol
for QKD:
Protocol 2:
Step 1: Entanglement distribution. Step 2: Error test.
Step 3: Error rejection. Step 4: Alice and Bob send all
trash cans to Eve. Step 5: They measure Z ⊗ Z to each
of the remained m pairs outside the trash cans and use
the result as an m−bit final key.
Step 1-3 are same with those in Protocol 1. As it has
been argued already, after Step 3 in protocol 2, the state
of remained m pairs is exponentially close to 1. There-
fore Eve’s information to the final key is upper bounded
by a negligibly small number ǫ′ [7], even Eve controls
everything except for the distilled m pairs, including all
pairs in trash cans and everything else outside Alice and
Bob’s labs.
This protocol is still useless for any actual entangle-
ment purification because it requires the collective mea-
surements though the step of dark Bell measurement to
each pair has now been removed. Now we show that
if we replace all collective measurements WW by local
measurements W ⊗W , the final result of the protocol is
unchanged.
For such a purpose, we first show that Step 4 can be
replaced by Step 4’:
Step 4’: Alice and Bob don’t send any states in trash cans
to Eve. Instead they take local measurement of W ⊗W
to the pairs in trash cans Tw, (Tw can be Tx, Ty or Tz.)
and announce the results.
If we only want an unconditionally secure final key,
we can use the following simple argument: A restrictive
Eve cannot do the attack better than an un-restricted
Eve. Eve in protocol 2 is an un-restricted Eve who con-
trols everything except for the distilled m pairs. Con-
sider a restriction requires Eve to measure W ⊗ W to
each pairs in trash cans Tw and announce the measure-
ment results. Note that except for this, Eve’s action to
everything else under her control is not restricted, e.g.,
the ancillas which had been prepared in the most initial
stage when Alice distributes EPR pairs to Bob. With
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the above restriction, Eve’s information to the final key
must be also bounded by ǫ′. Or in other words, if Eve’s
information is bounded by ǫ′ with whatever attack, her
information must be also bounded by ǫ′ with any specific
type of attack. Replacing Step 4 with Step 4’ in proto-
col 2 is equivalent to add the above restriction to Eve in
protocol 2. This is to say, it will cause no harm to the
security of final key if Alice and Bob keep all trash cans
and take local measurementW⊗W to pairs in trash cans
Tw and announce the measurement outcome.
We can also show that Step 4 can be replaced by Step
4’ by the fidelity criteria, from the viewpoint of entan-
glement purification. Consider the case that Step 4 is
replaced Step 4’. We only need to argue that the lo-
cal measurement in Step 4’ may cause no changes to the
fidelity of the m remained pairs. Suppose the state of
the total space immediately after Step 3 is ρt = ρm,c,e
and the subscript m, c, e denote for the subspace of m re-
mained pairs, trash cans and environment, respectively.
The state of the remainedm pairs immediately after Step
3 is
ρm = trc,eρt. (6)
The notation trc,e means the partial trace calculation in
subspaces of trash cans and environment. In the proto-
col, if the error test is passed, Alice and Bob will always
accept the remained m pairs no matter what the mea-
surement outcome they may obtain in Step 4’. Therefore
for the quantity of fidelity of the remained m pairs, we
only care about the averaged state for the m pairs after
after Step 4’, with the average being taken over all possi-
ble measurement results in Step 4’. Mathematically, the
averaged total state after Step 4’ is
ρ′
t
=
∑
L
〈L|ρt|L〉|L〉〈L|. (7)
Here |L〉 is an eigenstate of the local measurement to
those qubits in trash cans in Step 4’. Therefore the av-
eraged state for the remained m pairs after Step 4’ is
ρ′m = trc,eρ
′
t
= tre
∑
L
< L|ρt|L >= trc,eρt = ρm. (8)
This shows that the averaged state for the remained m
pairs after Step 4’ is just ρm, therefore Step 4’ does not
change the fidelity of the remained m pairs.
Now we show why all collective measurements WW
can simply be replaced by local measurements W ⊗W .
With Step 4 being replaced by Step 4’, each pairs in trash
cans are measured two times, the first isWW , the second
is W ⊗W . They commute, therefore one can exchange
the order of them. More over, once we have measured
W ⊗W , we do not need to measure WW , since the re-
sult of WW has been explicitly determined already by
the measurement W ⊗W . Therefore all the collective
measurements in protocol 2 can be replaced by local mea-
surements in each side. We obtain the following protocol
with all measurements being local:
Protocol 3:
Step 1: Entanglement distribution. Step 2: Error test.
They randomly pick out 3k pairs and equally divide
them into 3 groups. They take local measurement of
X ⊗ X,Y ⊗ Y, Z ⊗ Z to each pair in group 1,2,3, re-
spectively. They announce the measurement results and
discard those measured qubits. If too many of the results
from two sides disagree, the abort the protocol; otherwise
they continue. Step 3:a.) Bit-flip error rejection. They
randomly group the remained pairs with each group con-
taining 2 pairs. To each 2-pair group, they collect the
parity information to the destination pair by a Z−basis
bi-CNOT operation. They take local measurement Z⊗Z
to the destination pair and announce the measurement
results from two sides. If they are same, they discard
the destination pair and keep the control pair; if they are
different they discard both pairs. b.) Phase-flip error
rejection. They randomly group the remained pairs with
each group containing 2 pairs. To each 2-pair group, they
collect the X−basis parity information to the destination
pair by a X−basis bi-CNOT operation. They measure
X ⊗ X to the destination pair and announce the mea-
surement results from two sides. If they are same, they
discard the destination pair and keep the control pair; if
they are different they discard both pairs. They do op-
erations in a.) and b.) iteratively and finally there are
m pairs remained outside the trash cans. Step 4: They
measure Z ⊗ Z to each of the remained m pairs and use
the result as an m−bit final key.
So far we have given a detailed and rigorous proof of
the entanglement purification and security of QKD with
2-CC. There are two important issues in the reduction.
The first issue is the removal of the initial dark Bell mea-
surement: this measurement commute with bi-CNOTs
and all collective measurements of WW , therefore it can
be delayed and removed, with the fidelity of the purifi-
cation outcome unchanged. The second issue is, after
removal of dark Bell measurement, any collective mea-
surements WW can be replaced by local measurement of
W on each side, i.e., W ⊗W , since WW and W ⊗W
commute. Therefore we propose the following general
theorem:
Theorem: Suppose we have certain fidelity result for
the final pairs through a certain purification protocol with
product form of state for the raw pairs. We must have
the same fidelity result for the same protocol with what-
ever form of state for the raw pairs, provided that the
protocol satisfies the following conditions: (1) All quan-
tum operations needed are not more than bi-CNOTs and
local measurements on each side, i.e. {W ⊗W}; (2)The
fidelity result is unchanged if we replace any local mea-
surement W ⊗W by collective measurement WW ; (3)
All WW commute with dark Bell measurement.
Together with the main theorem in Ref [6], this the-
orem works effectively on the security proof of any
purification-based QKD protocol. We can just consider
the conditional purification first: the special case of prod-
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uct state for the raw pairs and consider the fidelity re-
sult of purification. After that, we use our theorem and
the main theorem in Ref [6] to reduce it to the uncondi-
tional entanglement purification and moreover, prepare-
and-measure QKD protocol.
To reduce protocol 3 to a prepare-and-measure proto-
col, we only need to replace the Phase-flip rejection part
in Step 3 with 3-pair phase error correction used in Ref
[6]. There are only bi-CNOTs and collective measure-
ments X ⊗X,Z ⊗ Z involved [6].According to our theo-
rem, the purification must be also unconditional. There-
fore the unconditional security of QKD [6,9,10] proto-
cols with 2-CC is confirmed. Similarly, the entanglement
purification protocol with hashing [2] and the one with
quantum error correction code [5] also only contains bi-
CNOTs and local measurement W ⊗W therefore the fi-
delity result of the protocol is unconditionally true with
whatever initial state. The issue of side information of
Shor-Preskill protocol has been studied by Hwang [11].
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